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IS THE LICENSE STILL THE PRODUCT? 
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz* 
The Supreme Court rejected the use of patent law to enforce conditional sales 
contracts in Impression Products v. Lexmark. The case appears to be just another 
step in the Supreme Court’s ongoing campaign to reset the Federal Circuit’s 
patent law jurisprudence. However, the decision casts a shadow on cases from all 
federal circuits that have enforced software licenses for more than 20 years and 
potentially imperils the business models on which software developers rely to 
create innovative products and to bring those products to market in a variety of 
useful ways. For over two decades, we could say that the license is the product—
software provides the functionality but the license provides what can be done with 
the software. Impression Products now raises a critical question for the software 
industry: is the license still the product? This Article answers that question by 
assessing the impact of the Impression Products case on software licensing. 
Fortunately, the case does not disrupt licenses used to develop products and leaves 
adequate room for innovative distribution licensing. Although the Supreme Court 
shut the door on enforcing end-user licenses using patent law, it left the door wide 
open for enforcing licenses using contract law. By linking the patent exhaustion 
and copyright first sale doctrines, the Supreme Court also seemed to shut the door 
on using copyright law to enforce end-user licenses. Although that linkage is 
accurate, the statutory scope of the copyright first sale doctrine differs from 
common law patent exhaustion, suggesting that end-user licenses still can be 
enforced using copyright law. To clarify this, however, Congress should amend the 
Copyright Act to explicitly recognize that end-user licenses are not copyright first 
sales. As Congress and the courts begin to address software licensing in the 
aftermath of Impression Products, one guiding principle seems clear—both 
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software developers and users will be better served if the license is still the 
product.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Software developers rely on license agreements1 in a multitude of ways. 
They use licenses to collaborate and share intellectual property during the software 
development process. They also use licenses to bring software products to market 
in a variety of useful ways. As software users, we encounter end-user licenses 
(often called “EULAs”) on a regular basis. In the days when users acquired boxes 
of software loaded on floppy disks, these licenses were known as “shrink-wrap” 
licenses.2 As software firms began delivering software pre-installed on computers 
or downloaded from the Internet, the licenses were called “click-wrap” licenses.3 
Now, software often is delivered as a service via a website with a license known as 
a “browse-wrap” license,4 or simply “terms of use.”5 The names have changed but 
the concept remains the same: even though software provides the functionality, the 
license provides what can be done with the software. In other words, the license is 
the product.6 
Software developers may love licenses, but many people love to hate 
licenses, especially EULAs.7 Criticisms of EULAs take many forms.8 Some focus 
on contract formation issues, arguing that EULAs are unenforceable contracts of 
adhesion.9 Others argue that EULAs should be preempted by federal intellectual 
                                                                                                            
 1. A license is a permission and, in software industry parlance, a license 
agreement is a contract that describes the terms and conditions of the permission. See infra 
Part II. 
 2. So-called because the user manifests assent to the license contract by tearing 
open the box’s plastic wrapper. 
 3. So-called because the user manifests assent to the license contract by 
clicking on an “I agree” button before the software runs or downloads. 
 4. So-called because the user manifests assent to the license contract by 
continuing to view or browse the website. 
 5. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006). 
Some software developers deploy both EULAs and terms of use. See MDY Indus. v. 
Blizzard Entm’t, 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010) (EULA for game software and terms of 
use for gaming service). 
 6. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License is the Product: Comments on the 
Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
891, 896 (1998). See generally Arthur A. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 
(1970). 
 7. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass 
Market Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 687–88 (2004) (noting that in 
the past 20 years, over 100 law-review articles have been written about EULAs, most of 
them critical of EULAs). See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Why is Everyone Afraid of IP 
Licenses?, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2017). 
 8. The criticisms of EULAs are addressed in Part II, infra. 
 9. Although many commentators raise concerns that EULAs are contracts of 
adhesion that harm consumers, most EULA litigation is business versus business rather than 
business versus consumer, so there is less concern about consumer protection. See Lemley, 
supra note 5, at 462–63; Guy A. Rub, Copyright Survives: Rethinking the             
Copyright-Contract Conflict, 103 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1200–02 (2017); see, e.g., 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussed by Professor 
Lemley, supra note 5, at 464, as illustrative of his point about EULA cases involving 
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property laws. Still others contend that EULAs are “first sales” under copyright 
law and therefore any restrictions on usage or re-distribution may be ignored.10 For 
more than two decades,11 however, state and federal courts have rejected these 
challenges, supporting the continuing widespread use of EULAs in the software 
industry.12 
The software industry is not alone in utilizing end-user licensing. Firms in 
the so-called copyright industries that provide music, motion pictures, books, 
journals, and newspapers also use EULA-based business models.13 Firms that sell 
patented hard goods do so as well, licensing products such as seeds14 and printer 
cartridges.15 The end-user licenses for patented products are referred to as 
conditional sales contracts rather than EULAs, reflecting a focus on the sale of the 
hard good rather than the rights in the underlying patent.16 
Judicial acceptance of conditional sales contracts for patented products 
has largely paralleled judicial acceptance of EULAs for software. So long as these 
contracts respect the normal rules of contract formation and avoid antitrust and 
patent-misuse issues, courts enforce them. The Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. provides a good illustration.17 Mallinckrodt 
sold nebulizer equipment to hospitals labeled “Single Use Only.”18 When hospitals 
contracted with a service company, Medipart, to refurbish the nebulizers, the 
                                                                                                            
businesses). Moreover, software users are “unforgiving of companies that try to license 
software on unreasonable terms, and the Internet has given them a powerful tool to express 
their views,” often causing software vendors to change course. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, 
at 898; see also AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP 2–4 
(2016) (recounting stories of objectionable EULA practices but also noting that vendors 
often back off following negative publicity). 
 10. The copyright first sale doctrine is set out in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 11. The first federal appellate court decision to enforce EULAs was ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In the end, the terms of the license are 
conceptually identical to the contents of the package.”). For a district court case predating 
the ProCD decision, see Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 
763–64 (D. Ariz. 1993). Another important EULA case is Specht v. Netscape Corp., 306 
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). The opinion in Specht was written by Justice Sotomayor when she 
was a circuit court judge. 
 12. See infra Part III; see also Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 688 n.7 
(summarizing the cases that have ruled on the enforceability of EULAs). 
 13. See John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial 
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2016) (describing Aspen’s 
Connected Casebook business model). See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Hollywood 
Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets, 64 DUKE L.J. 605 (2015). 
 14. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 281 (2013). 
 15. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529–30 
(2017). See generally Sean O’Connor, The Use of MTAs to Control Commercialization of 
Stem Cell Diagnostics and Therapeutics, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017 (2006). 
 16. See, e.g., Mallinkdrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
 17. Id. at 709; see also Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1372–
75 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (single-serve coffee brewing systems). 
 18. Mallinkdrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 702. 
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Federal Circuit ruled that Medipart was liable for patent infringement for ignoring 
the condition on use.19 
The U.S. Supreme Court has decided three conditional sales cases for 
patented products in recent years,20 but Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark 
International, Inc. presents a watershed moment for software licensing. In 
Impression Products, the Court ruled that the patent exhaustion doctrine prevents 
Lexmark from using patent law to enforce a condition in its sales contracts for ink-
jet printer cartridges. In doing so, the Court noted the strong link21 between the 
patent exhaustion doctrine and the copyright first sale doctrine.22 
Software is protected primarily by copyright.23 Consequently, Impression 
Products suggests that software license agreements may suffer the same fate as 
Lexmark’s conditional sales contracts, imperiling the business models that 
software developers rely on to create and distribute their products. Perhaps the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Impression Products is just another small step in its 
larger effort to reset the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence, but by linking 
patent and copyright law, the case casts a shadow on copyright licensing 
precedents across all 13 federal circuits. The case raises a critical question for 
software developers: is the license still the product? 
This Article answers that question by proceeding as follows: Part I 
explains the importance of licensing to all forms of innovation in the software 
industry and, in particular, the role that EULAs play in business-model innovation. 
Part II reviews the various challenges raised to the enforceability of EULAs and 
the judicial response to those challenges, including arguments based on contract 
law and the first sale doctrine. Part III begins the analysis of Impression Products 
by first examining the key conditional sales cases that led up to it. With that 
background in mind, Part IV closely examines the Court’s Impression Products 
opinion. 
Part V begins to apply the lessons learned from Impression Products to 
software licensing. It shows how the case does not disrupt upstream software 
development licensing models and leaves adequate room for distribution licensing. 
It highlights how the Court’s opinion normalizes EULAs as contracts and thus 
eases concerns about contract-law-based challenges to EULAs. Part V also 
explores the adequacy of contract remedies in EULA cases. It then explains that 
despite the Court’s emphatic rejection of patent remedies for conditional sales 
contracts and the link between the patent and copyright exhaustion doctrines, the 
Court has left the door ajar for using copyright remedies to enforce EULAs. This is 
                                                                                                            
 19. Id. at 709. Impression Products overturned Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, as 
discussed in Part IV, infra. 
 20. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. 1523; Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278 
(2013); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 21. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1536. 
 22. The copyright first sale doctrine is copyright’s exhaustion doctrine. See 17 
U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 23. See ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, SOFTWARE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 13–14 
(2014); see also infra Part II. 
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because the Copyright Act’s first sale doctrine provides a more limited defense to 
infringement than patent exhaustion does under common law. 
Part VI explores potential amendments to the Copyright Act that would 
clarify the first sale doctrine’s relationship to licenses. Part VII addresses several 
practical implications of Impression Products for lawyers who advise software 
developers and draft EULAs. Finally, Part VIII looks to the future—even if 
Impression Products presents challenges for today’s software products, what about 
tomorrow’s software products? It explains that, as the focus of software products 
shifts from floppy disks to embedded software and software as a service, the 
significance of Impression Products will vary widely. Ultimately, both software 
developers and users will be better served if the license is still the product. 
I. SOFTWARE TRANSACTION MODELS: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS 
Software does many things. Software entertains us, providing experiences 
as diverse as Candy Crush and Call of Duty. It improves our personal productivity, 
allowing us to create, calculate, and communicate faster and more efficiently than 
ever. Software also improves productivity in all sectors of the economy. Indeed, it 
is hard to imagine any part of our modern world where software does not (or will 
not) play an influential role.24 Before we know it, software will make driving an 
automobile truly “auto” and guide human beings to Mars.25 
Reflecting the multi-dimensional nature of software, legal protection for 
software comes in several forms. Copyright law provides the primary source of 
legal protection for software. Copyright law protects software in its human-
readable source code form,26 in its machine-readable object code form,27 and the 
visual displays that end users see and interact with.28 Trade secret law can also 
protect software source code.29 Patent law can protect software inventions, 
                                                                                                            
 24. See, e.g., Angel Gonzalez, Amazon’s Army of Robots, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2017, at D4 (“People don’t realize that Amazon Robotics has a huge software 
stack.”). See generally MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY, A HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY: 
FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE HEDGEHOG (2003). 
 25. See Rachael King, Hewlett Packard Enterprise to Send Supercomputer to 
Space, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hewlett-
packard-enterprise-to-send-supercomputer-to-space-1502473896; Ianthe Jeanne Dugan & 
Mike Spector, Tesla’s Push to Build a Self-Driving Car Sparked Dissent Among Its 
Engineers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2017, 12:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/teslas-
push-to-build-a-self-driving-car-sparks-dissent-among-its-engineers-1503593742; James 
Silver, Twelve Things You Need to Know about Driverless Cars, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2017, 
2:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/15/driverless-cars-12-things-
you-need-to-know. 
 26. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d 
Cir. 1983). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1440–47 (9th Cir. 
1994) (Macintosh user interface). 
 29. See McRoberts Software Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 569–70 (7th 
Cir. 2003); Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 216–
19 (3d Cir. 2002). 
2018]        IS THE LICENSE STILL THE PRODUCT? 431 
although the contours of patent protection for software remain a work in 
progress.30 
While we marvel at the transformative power of software, we often do not 
appreciate the importance of the business models that make software successful in 
the marketplace.31 The history of the software industry contains many cautionary 
tales of great software technology that faded away because its developers failed to 
adopt successful ways to bring it to market (that’s why you search with Google 
rather than AltaVista or Lycos).32 As software developers contemplate the best 
business model for their technology, they have many options. This Part explores 
these options showing, ultimately, why licensing has become the predominant 
transaction model in the software industry. 
A. Choosing a Transaction Model: Assignment of Rights and Public-Domain 
Dedications 
One potential transaction model is an assignment of rights.33 In this 
model, software developers convey the ownership of their intellectual property 
rights to a third party.34 This is a sale of the intellectual property rights themselves. 
The assignment-of-rights business model often works well for software developers 
who like to focus on software creation rather than software sales. An assignment of 
rights allows a software developer to create great software technology, transfer it 
to someone who has superior skill and resources in monetizing software, and move 
on to the next exciting software-development project with money in hand. 
A software developer may also choose to dedicate software to the public 
domain.35 Like an assignment of rights, a public-domain dedication transfers all 
intellectual property rights. But, rather than transferring the rights to a third party, 
a public-domain dedication transfers rights to the public at large. Some people put 
their software into the public domain for altruistic reasons. However, others put 
their software into the public domain as part of a business strategy, using it as a 
loss leader or publicity device to sell other products or services.36 
                                                                                                            
 30. See generally Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 31. See generally MICHAEL CUSUMANO, THE BUSINESS OF SOFTWARE 86 (2004); 
Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 
(2002). 
 32. See generally STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, 
AND SHAPES OUR LIVES (2011); KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE 
KNOW IT (2010). 
 33. See ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, XUAN-THAO NGUYEN & DANIELLE 
CONWAY, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & APPLICATION 19–20 (3d ed. 2014) 
(providing an overview of assignments of rights). 
 34. RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING § 5:3 (Westlaw, 
Dec. 2017); Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 831 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 35. See GOMULKIEWICZ, NGUYEN & CONWAY, supra note 33, at 20. 
 36. Id. 
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B. Choosing a Transaction Model: Copyright First Sale 
Alternatively, software developers may decide to sell copies of the 
software. This is known as a first sale under the Copyright Act.37 The virtue of the 
first sale business model lies in its simplicity.38 There is no need for an elaborate 
written contract—the customer simply pays the sale price to acquire a copy of the 
software. Books, newspapers, and magazines are normally sold using a first sale 
business model. 
The “sale” nomenclature sometimes creates confusion. A first sale does 
not sell the underlying intellectual property rights.39 A first sale is a sale of a copy, 
not a copyright.40 Indeed, the buyer purchases a discrete, limited permission—
namely, the permission to use and re-distribute a single copy of the software. A 
first sale does not allow the user to make or distribute additional copies or create 
derivative works, which are a key part of many software transaction models.41 For 
example, free and open-source software such as GNU/Linux requires permission 
to copy and create derivative works of the underlying software.42 
C. Choosing a Transaction Model: Licensing 
Even though assignments of rights, public-domain dedications, and first 
sales can be attractive options, licensing has emerged as the dominant transaction 
model for software because it enables both technological innovation and business-
model innovation.43 To understand this, this Section explains briefly how licenses 
                                                                                                            
 37. The copyright first sale doctrine is set out in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 38. See GOMULKIEWICZ, NGUYEN & CONWAY, supra note 33, at 18–19. 
 39. Id. at 18. 
 40. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (ownership of copyright as distinct from 
ownership of material object). 
 41. Section 117 of the Copyright Act allows the owner of a software copy to 
make any copies (e.g., copies made in random-access memory) or modifications that are an 
essential step in utilizing the software in the normal course and to make an archival copy. 17 
U.S.C. § 117 (2012). 
 42. See generally Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source 
Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563; David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source 
Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241; Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License 
Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 
2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179 (1999). 
 43. Intellectual-property licensing is as old as intellectual property itself. The 
1474 Venetian Patent Act mentions licensing in its text. See Giulio Mandich, Venetian 
Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 166, 177 (1948). 
[E]very person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this 
City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it 
to the office of our General Welfare Board . . . . It being forbidden to 
every other person in any of our territories and towns to make any 
further device conforming with and similar to said one, without the 
consent and license of the author, for the term of 10 years. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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are used to build software products, create customer solutions, distribute software, 
and enable software end use.44 
1. Licenses to Build Products  
Licensing is a legal tool used by software developers to build innovative 
products. The basic personal computer (“PC”) provides a good illustration. A PC 
runs operating-system software, such as GNU/Linux or Microsoft Windows. 
Although many see the “open source” GNU/Linux software and the “binary use” 
Microsoft Windows software45 as opposites in many respects,46 they share one 
important feature: they are developed using an array of licenses.47 
If the PC is running Windows software, then the user is running software 
created by dozens of programmers who are not employed by Microsoft. Windows 
software includes many lines of code written by third parties, small and large.48 It 
also includes inventions that are covered by third-party patents and depends upon 
third-party information, including trade secrets. Licensing is the primary legal tool 
that Microsoft uses to include third-party technology in its Windows software.49 
The operating system may be called Microsoft Windows, but it is a more 
innovative product than Microsoft could create alone because of the third-party 
technology included via licensing.50 
If the PC is running the GNU/Linux operating system, then licensing has 
also played a key role in the operating system’s creation. Linus Torvalds is known 
as the author of the Linux kernel, yet Torvalds did not write most of the code that 
comprises Linux today. Linux is the product of hundreds of programmers51 who 
combine their work.52 From a legal perspective, Linux was created by hundreds of 
licenses exchanged between the contributors to the Linux project. Further, Linux is 
only part of the operating system (the kernel). The Linux kernel is combined with 
                                                                                                            
 44. Section I.C. draws largely from material contained in Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature and 
Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 204–08 (2009). 
 45. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free 
Software Movement’s Constitution, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1015, 1019–21 (2005) (explaining the 
difference between binary-use and open-source software). 
 46. See ROBERT YOUNG & WENDY GOLDMAN ROHM, UNDER THE RADAR: HOW 
RED HAT CHANGED THE SOFTWARE BUSINESS—AND TOOK MICROSOFT BY SURPRISE 81 
(1999). 
 47. See HEATHER J. MEEKER, THE OPEN SOURCE ALTERNATIVE 27–49 (2008); 
LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING 51–69 (2004). 
 48. See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in 
Platform Markets for Informational Goods, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1861 (2011). 
 49. See GOMULKIEWICZ, NGUYEN & CONWAY, supra note 33, at 397. 
 50. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffery A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. 
U. L. REV. 775, 776–92 (2008) (describing how technology companies, such as Microsoft 
and Sun Microsystems, improve their products by acquiring third-party technology). 
 51. See ERIC. S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX 
AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 21–63 (1999). 
 52. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 172–79 (2004). 
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GNU software from the Free Software Foundation53 (hence “GNU/Linux”) and 
other third-party code via licensing to create a complete operating system.54 
2. Licenses to Create Customer Solutions 
After a technology product is built, the producer often wants to maximize 
the way that it interacts with other technologies so that the product is useful to end 
users.55 For example, a PC may have a central processing unit produced by Dell; a 
pointing device developed by LogiTech; a microprocessor designed by AMD and 
fabricated by NEC; a keyboard manufactured by IBM; speakers by Bose; and 
software written by Microsoft, Mozilla, Apache, and Adobe. It may also connect to 
the Internet with technology created using standards by IETF and W3C, and 
telephony provided by AT&T.56  For the PC to work as a useful customer system, 
these entities had to share technology, information, or intellectual property. 
Licensing is the method that allows this sharing to occur. 
3. Licenses to Distribute Products 
One feature of the information economy is the innovative ways that 
information product distributors get products to market.57 Continuing with the PC 
example, PC software developers distribute their products through Value Added 
Resellers (“VARs”), Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEMs”), distributors 
(e.g., Ingram), and retailers (e.g., Wal-Mart, Best Buy).58 Software is also 
distributed electronically via email attachments, chat rooms, websites, social-
media platforms, and bulletin boards. Licensing is the legal tool that enables these 
diverse distribution practices. 
                                                                                                            
 53. See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED 
ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 28 (2002). 
 54. See Richard M. Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software 
Movement, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 53, 65–66 
(DiBona et al. eds., 1999). 
 55. A good example is the efforts of Microsoft and Amazon to partner on 
compatibility between their virtual assistants, Cortana and Alexa. See Matt Day, Amazon 
Deal with Microsoft Likely Good for both Tech Giants, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 31, 2017, at 
A1; Laura Stevens & Tripp Mickle, Alexa, Siri and Rivals Battle for the Home, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 2, 2017, at A1. 
 56. See Why Everything is Hackable, ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2017, at 69–70. 
 57. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(describing multiple distribution channels for video content, including distribution on disks, 
through cable channels, and via streaming services). 
 58. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011); Adobe 
Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Microsoft 
Corp. v. Grey Comput., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995); Microsoft Corp. v. 
Harmony Computs. & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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4. Licenses to Use Products 
Software publishers began using EULAs as the personal-computer 
revolution unfolded.59 Software licensing existed before that time, but software 
was not a mass-market product and the use of standard form contracts was 
unnecessary. End-user licensing provides a means for PC software developers to 
offer users various information products at various price points for various uses.60 
Software publishers come in all shapes and sizes and with a multitude of 
objectives. Universities, non-profit organizations, individuals, groups, and firms all 
develop and license software to end users using EULAs.61 Free and open-source 
software again provides a powerful example. Because of open-source licensing, 
software users have the freedom to add new features and fix bugs and the legal 
ability to hire others to do the same.62 End-user licensing also provides a means for 
software developers to offer packages of software and services; flexible         
client-server computing-usage models; the same code to business users at one 
price, home users for a lower price, academic users for yet a lower price, and 
charitable organizations for free; and the right to make multiple copies for multiple 
devices.63 
II. CHALLENGES TO EULAS 
A. State Contract-Law Challenges 
Although software developers appreciate the value of EULAs, others do 
not. Some criticize EULA contract64 formation and fairness, arguing that the 
contract-formation process is flawed;65 that the “take it or leave it” process is 
unfair;66 that the “pay first, terms come later” sequence is problematic;67 and that it 
                                                                                                            
 59. To give one prominent example, the Netscape Navigator browser achieved 
its early success with a EULA granting noncommercial users the right to freely copy and 
distribute the software. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, at 899. 
 60. Id. at 903; Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense 
of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 
passim (1996). 
 61. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, at 894–95. 
 62. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 
64 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 75–76 (2002). 
 63. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 44, at 208. 
 64. See McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“[A] license is a contract governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.”); see also 
Christopher M. Newman, A License is Not a “Contract Not to Sue”: Disentangling 
Property and Contract in the Law of Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101 (2013); Mark R. 
Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent and Notice in Intellectual Property, 40 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105 (2012). 
 65. See David A. Einhorn, Box-Top Licenses and the Battle of the Forms, 5 
SOFTWARE L.J. 401, 404–11 (1992); Richard H. Stern, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass-
Market Software: Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECH. L.J. 51 passim (1985). 
 66. See generally Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrunk-Wrapped the Consumer—
The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 354–60 
(1999). 
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is too easy to hide terms.68 Courts have turned aside these challenges unless the 
software developer failed to give the user a reasonable opportunity to review the 
license agreement or the user did not meaningfully manifest assent.69 In other 
words, judicial construction of EULAs has gone about the same way as other 
standard-form contract cases: terms are construed against the drafter, 
unconscionable terms are not enforced, specifically negotiated terms win out over 
terms in the form, and users are not excused because they chose not to read the 
contract.70 
B. Federal Preemption Challenges 
Another set of challenges to EULAs focuses on federal preemption. 
EULAs sit at the often turbulent intersection of state contract law and federal 
intellectual property law.71 Some argue that EULAs cannot be enforced because 
federal intellectual property law supersedes enforcement of state contract law.72 
                                                                                                            
 67. See generally Michael J. Madison, Legal Ware: Contract and Copyright in 
the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025 (1998). But see Robert A. Hillman, Rolling 
Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 passim (2002) (arguing that reasonable terms of 
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 68. See generally Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust 
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for Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753. 
 69. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2010); MDY Indus. v. Blizzard 
Entm’t, 629 F.3d 928, 957 (9th Cir. 2010); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 
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Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate 
Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059–60 (N.D. Cal. 2002); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. 
Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335–38 (D. Mass. 2002); Storm Impact, 
Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 791 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Ariz. Retail 
Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 764–67 (D. Ariz. 1993); I-A Equip. 
Co. v. I-Code, Inc., 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 807 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000); M.A. Mortenson 
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 307 (Wash. 2005). For cases where the 
court found inadequate opportunity to review or manifestation of assent, see, for example, 
Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Christenson, 809 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2015); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble 
Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 70. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 23–66, 347–75 (7th ed. 2014); E.A. 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 3.3, 3.10–.30, 4.9, 4.26 (4th ed. 2004). See generally Robert 
A. Hillman & Jeffery L. Rachlinsky, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002). 
 71. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of 
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111 (1999); Raymond T. Nimmer, 
Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827 (1998) (arguing that intellectual property and contract law work 
in “comfortable tandem”). 
 72. See generally Dennis J. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-
Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the 
Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption and Software License 
Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995). 
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For copyrighted works such as software, preemption issues can arise under either 
§ 301 of the Copyright Act or the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.73  
However, courts have concluded that contract law does not involve the same rights 
as copyright law and, for the most part, courts have rejected challenges to EULAs 
on this basis.74 
C. Copyright First Sale Challenges 
 The Supreme Court articulated the first sale doctrine in 1908 in Bobbs-
Merrill v. Straus.75 According to the Court, a copyright holder’s exclusive right to 
distribute copies ends for any given copy after the owner’s sale of that copy.76 
Congress codified the first sale doctrine in § 109(a) of the Copyright Act. The 
modern first sale doctrine allows the “owner of a particular copy” to sell or dispose 
of the copy without the copyright holder’s permission.77 
The first sale doctrine only applies to owners of copies; it does not apply 
to a person who possesses a copy without owning it, such as a licensee.78 A 
licensee only has permission to use or distribute a copy as provided in the license 
agreement. Thus, it is critical to ascertain whether the software developer has sold 
or licensed its software. The issue arises in various contexts in the software 
industry, three of which are useful to highlight. 
Some cases arise in what I call the unbundling context. Some software 
developers distribute packages or suites of software at a discount compared to the 
price of the individual components. Sometimes a party in the chain of distribution 
unbundles the software packages to sell the components separately, hoping to 
                                                                                                            
 73. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Fostering the Business of Innovation: The 
Untold Story of Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 445, 454, 
465–66 (2012) (describing the application of § 301 and the Supremacy Clause in Bowers v. 
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 74. See, e.g., Utopia Provider Sys. Inc. v. Pro-Med Clinical Sys., LLC, 596 F.3d 
1313, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2010); Blizzard Entm’t v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638–39 (8th Cir. 
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 75. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 76. Id. at 350–51. 
 77. See generally Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY 
L.J. 741 (2015); Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy 
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887 (2010); John 
A. Rothschild, The Incredible Shrinking First Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits 
Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 78. Cf. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anaza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 
146–47 (1998) (“[T]he first sale doctrine would not provide a defense to a §602(a) action 
against any non-owner such as a bailee, a licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of 
the copy was unlawful.”). 
438 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:425 
profit from the higher prices that can be charged for the individual components. 
Software developers use license contracts to prevent this unbundling.79 
A second context deals with limitations placed on software use. A 
common example is discounted software licensed only for academic use or 
software provided at no charge for evaluation purposes.80 Another common 
example is software licensed at one price for business use and at a lower price for 
personal use.81 
A third context concerns EULA restrictions imposed on end-user           
re-distribution of the software. These restrictions are often placed on high-priced 
software (EULAs for consumer-oriented mass-market software products often 
allow re-distribution so long as the original user does not keep a copy). For 
example, in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., the Ninth Circuit upheld a limit on 
distribution contained in the EULA for Autodesk’s AutoCAD computer-aided 
design software that retails for around $1,600.82 
As the prior illustrations highlight, determining whether a given 
transaction is a license or a first sale is critical in the software business. If a 
software user can claim the benefits of the first sale doctrine, then the user can 
ignore EULA restrictions on use or re-distribution. In practice, this determination 
is difficult to make—not every transaction that a software developer labels as a 
license should qualify as such, and some transactions that do not mention the word 
license still should be treated as licenses under the law. 
Considering this difficulty, the Ninth Circuit developed a test for 
distinguishing between licenses and first sale transactions.83 The court in Vernor v. 
Autodesk held that “a software user is a licensee rather than the owner of a copy 
where the copyright owner: (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) 
significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes 
notable use restrictions.”84 The court used this test to determine that the EULA for 
Autodesk was a license, and in two additional cases decided by the same panel,85 
ruled that one transaction was a license86 and another was a first sale.87 
                                                                                                            
 79. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011); Adobe 
Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Microsoft Corp. 
v. Grey Comput., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995); Microsoft Corp. v. 
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 80. See, e.g., Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 
(D. Ariz. 1993); cf. UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011) (music 
CD sent for evaluation purposes in a first sale rather than a license transaction). 
 81. See, e.g., ProCD. Inc. v. Zeindenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 82. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 83. Id. at 1111. 
 84. Id. 
 85. The three judges deciding the Vernor, MDY Industries, and UMG 
Recordings cases were William C. Canby, Jr., Consuelo M. Callahan, and Sandra S. Ikuta. 
 86. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2010) (EULA 
for World of Warcraft software and service). 
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D. The Many Facets of Copyright First Sales 
Before turning to Impression Products, it is useful to highlight the many 
facets of copyright’s first sale doctrine to understand the Court’s decision about 
patent exhaustion and its ramifications. Part II explained that a first sale, as a type 
of transaction, is akin to a limited license because the user receives limited use and 
re-distribution rights. As such, a first sale is useful as a transaction model in some 
contexts but not in many others. A first sale can also be characterized as a user 
“privilege”88 along the lines of copyright “fair use,”89 which balances user rights 
against the exclusive rights granted to authors in the Copyright Act. In practice, 
however, the first sale doctrine has another facet: it is a defense to a claim of 
copyright infringement. As such, it directly affects the remedies that a copyright 
holder can recover for breach of a EULA—if the transaction is a first sale, then 
there is no infringement for using and re-distributing a copy and no copyright 
remedies are available. 
III. PRELUDE TO IMPRESSION PRODUCTS V. LEXMARK 
A. Early Supreme Court Cases 
Long before the term software became a household word,90 the Supreme 
Court had been considering applying patent exhaustion to conditional sales 
contracts for patented products.91 Like a copyright first sale, patent exhaustion 
ends the intellectual property holder’s right to control use and resale of a product.92 
Also, like the copyright first sale doctrine, the patent exhaustion doctrine 
originated in the common law but, unlike the first sale doctrine, patent exhaustion 
has never been codified in the U.S. patent statutes.93 
The Supreme Court’s modern patent exhaustion jurisprudence dates back 
to the World War II era. In 1938, the Court decided General Talking Pictures 
Corp. v. Western Electric Co. In General Talking Pictures, a patentee licensed a 
company to manufacture and sell amplifiers for noncommercial use only.94 A 
commercial end user purchased the amplifiers from the distributor knowing that its 
                                                                                                            
 87. UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“evaluation only” music CD). 
 88. The legislative history of § 109(a) calls it a privilege. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 
at 79 (1976). 
 89. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 90. The term software came into general usage around 1960. See FREDRICK P. 
BROOKS, THE MYTHICAL MAN MONTH: ESSAYS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 4 (1975). 
 91. See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852); Providence 
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 92. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942). 
 93. See Vince Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What’s It Good For?, 51 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2011). See generally Sean M. O’Connor, Origins of Patent 
Exhaustion: Jacksonian Politics, Patent Farming, and the Basis of the Bargain (Univ. of 
Wash. Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 2017-05), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920738. 
 94. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 125–26 (1938). 
440 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:425 
purchase was unlicensed.95 The Supreme Court ruled that the amplifiers were sold 
outside the scope of the license and allowed the patentee to sue both the licensee 
and its customer.96 
Four years after General Talking Pictures, the Supreme Court decided 
United States v. Univis Lens Co.97 In that case, a maker of eyeglass lenses 
authorized an agent to sell its lenses to wholesalers and retailers on the condition 
that they sell the lenses at fixed prices. The U.S. government sued the Univis Lens 
Company for violating antitrust law. In its defense, Univis Lens argued that its 
conditional sales contracts were justified by its right to exclude use and sale under 
patent law. However, the Court rejected that argument, ruling that the initial sales 
to the wholesalers and retailers “relinquish[ed] . . . the patent monopoly with 
respect to the article[s] sold.”98 
B. Federal Circuit’s Conditional Sales Cases 
Univis Lens closed the book on the Supreme Court’s consideration of the 
patent exhaustion doctrine until 2008. However, the patent exhaustion doctrine 
continued to evolve in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Congress created the 
Federal Circuit in 1982 to unify appellate jurisdiction of patent law cases.99 In 
doing so, Congress hoped to improve innovation by giving patentees a uniform 
body of judicial interpretations decided by judges with patent law expertise.100 
Since that time, the Federal Circuit has been a vigorous developer of patent law.101 
The Federal Circuit’s foundational patent exhaustion case was 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.102 In that case, a manufacturer of medical 
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 97. 316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
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Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004). 
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 102. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For articles discussing Mallinckrodt, see 
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Decision, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 550 (1993); and Richard H. Stern, The 
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equipment, Mallinckrodt, sold nebulizers labeled as “Single Use Only” to 
hospitals.103 When hospitals contracted with a service company, Medipart, to 
refurbish the equipment for reuse, Mallinckrodt sued Medipart for patent 
infringement and inducement to infringe.104 Relying on General Talking Pictures, 
the Federal Circuit ruled that patent exhaustion occurs when the patentee makes an 
unconditional sale. By placing an express restriction on reuse, the patent holder 
could create a restricted license rather than an unconditional sale.105 
The Federal Circuit elaborated upon Mallinckrodt in B. Braun Medical, 
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories.106 In B. Braun Medical, Inc., the Federal Circuit ruled 
that an unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s right to 
control the purchaser’s use of the device but that this exhaustion doctrine does not 
apply to an expressly conditional sale or license. In such a transaction, it is more 
reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of 
the “use” rights conferred by the patentee.107 
A decade after Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit revisited patent 
exhaustion in a different context. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs108 dealt with a licensing 
model for genetically modified seeds.109 Monsanto licensed its biotechnology for 
“Roundup Ready” seeds to seed-distribution companies that then licensed the 
seeds to end-user growers.110 This technology allows growers to use the pesticide 
“Roundup” for weed control without killing the genetically modified plants.111 
Monsanto’s license allowed the seed distributors to incorporate Monsanto 
technology into the distributors’ germ plasma, subject to certain conditions, 
including a condition that the seed distributors would not sell seed to growers 
unless the grower signed a Monsanto end-user license agreement.112 
Scruggs, a grower, argued that he was not bound by the license conditions 
under the doctrine of patent exhaustion. However, the court found no patent 
                                                                                                            
Unobserved Demise of the Exhaustion Doctrine in US Patent Law, 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
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 103. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 708–09. 
 106. 124 F.3d 1419, 1426–27 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 107. Id. at 1426. 
 108. 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 109. First sale legal issues aside, Monsanto v. Scruggs raises interesting, 
challenging, and controversial ethical issues about food and agricultural policy. See Peter 
Carstensen, Post-Sale Restraints Via Patent Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Perspective, 16 
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Scruggs: The Negative Impact of Patent Exhaustion on Self-Replicating Technology, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 116 (2007); The End of Cheap Food, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2007, 
at 11. 
 110. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. The end-user license with growers included the following restrictions: the 
seed could be used only for planting a single crop; no transfer of seed for replanting; 
prohibition on research or experimentation; and payment of a technology fee. Id. 
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exhaustion, reasoning that “[t]here was no unrestricted sale because the use of the 
seeds by seed growers was conditioned on obtaining a license from Monsanto.”113 
Moreover, as to the second generation of seeds, there was no “sale” by Monsanto 
(or the seed distributor for that matter), and therefore no “first sale” under patent 
law.114 
Shortly after the Scruggs decision, the Federal Circuit again took up 
patent exhaustion in Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics.115 In Quanta Computer, 
LG licensed certain computer systems patents to Intel.116 LG’s license with Intel 
contained a provision prohibiting use of LG’s patents with non-Intel devices117 and 
requiring Intel to notify its customers of this prohibition.118 Intel sold chipsets 
covered by LG’s patents to Quanta Computer and provided the required 
notification.119 
When Quanta used Intel chipsets with non-Intel devices and failed to 
obtain the appropriate patent rights from LG, LG sued for patent infringement. 
Quanta argued that LG’s patent rights were exhausted because Quanta bought the 
chipsets from Intel in an unconditional sale.120 The Federal Circuit disagreed, 
holding that because Intel was limited by its license with LG as to how Intel could 
pass on patent rights to Intel’s chipsets, and because it provided notice to Quanta 
of this limitation, the sale was conditional.121 Because the sale was conditional, 
LG’s patent rights were not exhausted.122 
C. The Supreme Court Returns to Patent Exhaustion 
At this juncture, the Supreme Court took Quanta Computer and reentered 
the patent exhaustion debate as part of its campaign to reset the Federal Circuit’s 
patent jurisprudence.123 The U.S. Solicitor General and several amicus briefs urged 
the Court to use Quanta Computer as a vehicle to overturn all Mallinckrodt-related 
jurisprudence.124 The Court reversed the Federal Circuit in a unanimous opinion 
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written by Justice Thomas, but did not overrule, criticize, or even mention 
Mallinckrodt.125 
The Court cited General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric Co.126 for 
the proposition that exhaustion does not apply where a sale is unauthorized. 
However, the Court found that Intel’s sale was authorized, citing “the structure of 
the Intel-LG transaction.”127 Justice Thomas pointed specifically to language in the 
Intel-LG license that granted Intel broad rights to make, use, sell (directly or 
indirectly), offer to sell, import, or otherwise dispose of products, free from LG’s 
patent claims. The license agreement also purported not to “in any way limit or 
alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would otherwise apply.”128 
The Court acknowledged that the parties had agreed in a separate license 
that Intel would notify Intel’s customers that they were not licensed to practice 
LG’s patents in Intel/non-Intel combinations (and had given that notice to Quanta), 
but found that “Intel’s authority to sell its products embodying the LGE Patents 
was not conditioned on the notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s 
directions in that notice.”129 If anything, the Court indicated, LG might have a 
claim for breach of contract, but because LG had not pled a contract claim, the 
Court did not address it.130 
The Quanta Computer ruling did not come as a surprise.131 It fit neatly 
into the Court’s pattern of correcting the Federal Circuit’s direction for patent 
law.132 Most saw Quanta Computer as just one more Supreme Court 
admonishment of the Federal Circuit for over-extending the rights of patent 
holders. 
One notable exception to this Federal Circuit reset, however, involved the 
patent exhaustion doctrine. In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., the Supreme Court 
considered the question of patent exhaustion in the context of Monsanto’s sale of 
patented Roundup Ready soybean seeds just as the Federal Circuit had done in 
Scruggs.133 Monsanto’s license agreement for the seeds only permitted their use in 
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one (and only one) growing season.134 When Mr. Bowman violated the license, 
Monsanto sued him for patent infringement. Bowman raised the defense of patent 
exhaustion but the District Court and Federal Circuit rejected Bowman’s 
defense.135 And, surprisingly, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the 
Federal Circuit.136 
In one sense, Bowman involved a condition on the use of a patented 
product much like the conditional sale in Makinckrodt.137 However, in substance, 
Bowman touched on the “make” right rather than the “use” right in patent law, 
because Mr. Bowman harvested and planted seeds grown from the licensed seeds. 
In other words, Mr. Bowman made new seeds from the old seeds. As such, patent 
exhaustion did not apply because it pertains to the use and sale of an item, and not 
the making of a new item. As the Court put it, “exhaustion applies only to the item 
sold, not to reproductions.”138 
D. A Copyright First Sale Interjection 
Amidst the Supreme Court’s focus on patent law cases, the Court also 
decided an important copyright first sale issue: whether the sale of copyrighted 
works made overseas qualifies as a first sale under U.S. copyright law.139 
Academic textbook publisher John Wiley & Sons licensed its wholly owned Asian 
subsidiary to print and distribute textbooks for the Asian market.140 Wiley Asia’s 
books contained a notice stating that they were not to be taken (without 
permission) into the United States.141 Supap Kirtsaeng moved from Thailand to the 
United States to study mathematics.142 He asked friends and family to buy foreign-
edition English-language Wiley Asia textbooks in Thai book shops where they 
sold at low prices and to mail them to him in the United States. He then resold the 
books. John Wiley & Sons sued Mr. Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement, and Mr. 
Kirtsaeng raised copyright first sale as a defense.143 
The Court sided with Mr. Kirtsaeng. Justice Breyer’s opinion for the 
Court engages in a thorough analysis of § 109(a) of the Copyright Act in the 
context of foreign sales of copyrighted works. The Court held that the first sale 
doctrine applies to all copies legally made and sold anywhere in the world, not just 
in the United States.144 Thus, wherever an authorized copy of a copyrighted work 
is first sold, it can be resold in the United States without obtaining additional 
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permission from the copyright holder. The Court concluded that Mr. Kirtsaeng’s 
defense was supported by § 109(a)’s “language, its context, and the common-law 
history of the ‘first sale’ doctrine.”145 
IV. A CLOSE LOOK AT IMPRESSION PRODUCTS V. LEXMARK 
We now turn to the Supreme Court’s decision in Impression Products, 
Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.146 The case centered on Lexmark’s business 
model for selling its patented toner cartridges for laser printers.147 When a 
cartridge runs out of toner, it can either be refilled or replaced with a new one. 
Lexmark will gladly sell a new toner cartridge, but other companies, known as 
remanufacturers, buy up empty cartridges, refill them with toner, and sell them at a 
price lower than the price charged by Lexmark for a new one. To compete with the 
remanufacturers, Lexmark sells cartridges using a business model that encourages 
customers to return empty cartridges.148 Lexmark offers two options: a full priced 
“no strings attached” option or a 20% discount through Lexmark’s Return 
Program.149 To participate in the Return Program, the customer signs a contract 
agreeing to use the cartridge only once and to refrain from transferring it to anyone 
except Lexmark.150 
Undeterred by the contractual arrangements in Lexmark’s Return 
Program, Impression Products acquired, refilled, and sold cartridges that Lexmark 
customers had purchased via the Return Program.151 Lexmark responded by suing 
Impression Products (and several other remanufacturers) for patent infringement. 
In defense, Impression Products argued that Lexmark’s patents had been exhausted 
when Lexmark sold the toner cartridges to its customers.152 When the case reached 
the Federal Circuit, the en banc court rejected the patent exhaustion defense, citing 
its Mallinckrodt v. Medipart line of cases.153 
The Supreme Court took the case to address two questions: (1) “whether a 
patentee that sells an item under an express restriction on the purchaser’s right to 
reuse or resell the product may enforce that restriction through an infringement 
lawsuit”; and (2) “whether a patentee exhausts its patent rights by selling its 
product outside the United States, where American patent laws do not apply.”154 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court reversed the Federal Circuit 8–0 on 
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the first question and 7–1 on the second question,155 with only Justice Ginsberg 
dissenting (largely based on her dissent in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons). And 
this time—unlike in Quanta Computer—the Court specifically addressed the 
Federal Circuit’s Mallinckrodt line of cases. 
As to the first question, the Court concluded that Lexmark had exhausted 
its patent rights in the printer cartridges the moment it sold them. “The single 
use/no-resale restrictions in Lexmark’s contracts with customers may have been 
clear and enforceable under contract law,” according to the Court, “but they did 
not entitle Lexmark to retain patent rights in an item that it has elected to sell.”156 
The Court called the exhaustion of patent rights “uniform and automatic,” 
operating “regardless of any post-sale restrictions the patentee purports to impose” 
either directly with a customer or indirectly through an upstream license.157 The 
Court asserted that its views on patent exhaustion were well-settled, citing its 1918 
decision in Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone and its 1942 Univis 
Lens decision. With a slight tone of indignation, the Court stated that “if there were 
any lingering doubt,” Quanta Computer had “settled the matter.”158 
Critical to the Court’s ruling is the distinction between a tangible item and 
an intangible invention.159 When a customer buys a product, the customer owns 
that physical item as personal property with all the benefits that come with 
property ownership.160 Although patent law gives a patentee the right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling an invention, it does not alter the underlying 
ownership equation for the product that embodies the invention. When the patentee 
sells an item covered by a patent, the patent exhaustion doctrine automatically lifts 
the patent’s power to exclude use or sale of the item because, at that point, the 
patent holder has received the reward from the invention provided by patent law.161 
The Court highlighted its policy rationale: the historical hostility to 
restraints on alienation of chattels. The Court called these restraints “hateful” and 
“obnoxious to the public interest,” and observed that “the inconvenience and 
annoyance to the public that an opposite conclusion would occasion” would be 
“too obvious to require illustration.”162 The Court worried that extending patent 
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rights beyond first sale “would clog the channels of commerce, with little benefit 
from the extra control that the patentees retain,” with advances in the complexity 
of technology and supply chains likely to magnify the problem.163 
The Court also criticized the approach to patent exhaustion that the 
Federal Circuit had employed in Mallinckrodt and its progeny. According to the 
Court, the Federal Circuit’s misstep resulted from focusing too much on the Patent 
Act’s right to exclude as a presumption that could be altered by contract.164 This, 
the Court ruled, was a misstep because the exhaustion doctrine is not a 
presumption about the authority that comes along with a sale; it is instead a limit 
on the scope of the patentee’s rights.165 In other words, once the patentee decides 
to sell a product unit, all of the patentee’s use and sale rights are exhausted for that 
product unit, not just the rights the patentee might wish to exhaust.166 
At this point, the Court paused to address an inconvenient precedent: 
General Talking Pictures, a case relied on heavily by the Federal Circuit in 
Mallinckrodt. Not surprisingly, the Court distinguished the case as involving “a 
fundamentally different situation.”167 Recall that the transaction in General 
Talking Pictures involved three parties: the patentee, a licensee, and an end-user 
customer.168 The license agreement prohibited the licensee from selling products to 
certain types of customers.169 When the licensee sold to those customers, the Court 
permitted the patentee to sue both the licensee and the customer for patent 
infringement.170 
To be sure, the factual setting for Lexmark’s suit was fundamentally 
different than General Talking Pictures’s suit: Lexmark sued a third-party 
remanufacturer who acquired a product from one of Lexmark’s customers, 
whereas General Talking Pictures sued a customer of its manufacturer/distributor 
licensee. But the Court did not highlight or rely on this factual distinction. Instead, 
the Court justified the patent infringement suit against the customer in General 
Talking Pictures because the customer knew about the breach of the license and 
thus had “participated in the licensee’s infringement.”171 According to the Court, 
“General Talking Pictures, then, stands for the modest principle that, if a patentee 
has not given authority for a licensee to make a sale, that sale cannot exhaust the 
patentee’s rights.”172 
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After reversing the Federal Circuit on the first question, the Court went 
on to reverse the Federal Circuit on the second question as well, ruling that once a 
product is sold anywhere in the world, the patent rights are exhausted for that 
unit.173 This ruling unified the Court’s approach to patent exhaustion with its 
approach to copyright first sales as articulated in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons. 
In so doing, the Court relied on the “historic kinship” between patent and 
copyright law and the “strong identity” between patent exhaustion and copyright 
first sales.174 Treating patent exhaustion and copyright first sales differently, 
according to the Court, would “make little theoretical or practical sense,” 
especially in a world where many products are covered by both patents and 
copyrights.175 
The Court’s linkage of copyright first sales and patent exhaustion means 
that Impression Products is not simply another small skirmish in the Supreme 
Court’s ongoing battle with the Federal Circuit over the direction of patent law. 
Instead, the case affects copyright first sale precedents from all 13 circuit courts. 
And critically, it impacts the business models used by the software industry. We 
now turn to the potential impact of Impression Products on the software industry, 
looking at the ramifications for each part of the software-licensing landscape 
described in Part I. 
V. APPLYING IMPRESSION PRODUCTS TO THE SOFTWARE 
LICENSING LANDSCAPE 
As described in Part I, software licenses can be fit into four basic 
categories: (1) to build products; (2) to create customer solutions; (3) to distribute 
products; and (4) to enable end use. Categories 1 and 2 are often referred to as 
“upstream” licenses and categories 3 and 4 as “downstream” licenses. How does 
Impression Products affect these licenses? 
A. Upstream Licenses 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Impression Products will have little or 
no effect on upstream licenses for several reasons. 
First, most upstream licenses require grants of rights that are more 
expansive than a copyright first sale allows. A copyright first sale only allows use 
and re-distribution of a single copy. However, upstream licenses typically involve 
rights to create derivative works and to make and distribute multiple copies.176 For 
example, when Microsoft incorporates third-party code into its Windows operating 
system or when the Linux Foundation incorporates contributor code into the Linux 
kernel, Microsoft and the Linux Foundation need the rights to modify, reproduce, 
and distribute multiple copies of the underlying third-party code and any derivative 
works. Moreover, Bowman v. Monsanto suggests that transactions focused on 
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making copies will not be swept into the patent exhaustion doctrine and,177 by 
extension, presumably will not be treated as copyright first sales either. 
Second, upstream licensing focuses more on copyrights than copies.178 In 
other words, software developers use upstream licenses to exchange whatever 
collection of intellectual property rights are needed to successfully build a 
particular piece of software technology.179 To the extent the parties exchange 
copies at all, it is only to kick-start the overall collaboration and to exercise the 
licensed intellectual property rights.180 Upstream licenses enable software 
development so that that each party can build products that it will provide to 
customers downstream.181 
B. Downstream Licenses 
The impact of Impression Products on downstream licenses is far greater 
than its impact on upstream licenses. Thus, this Section will discuss both licenses 
to distribute and licenses to enable use. 
1. Licenses to Distribute Software 
As explained in Part I, software developers use a variety of methods to 
distribute their software. In the early days of the software industry, software 
developers distributed their software either in boxes via the retail distribution 
channel or preinstalled on computers via the OEM182 channel. Retail distribution 
involves several stages. After the software developer writes the software code, the 
software developer provides a master disk to a software manufacturer that copies 
the software on to diskettes and shrink-wraps them into boxes. The manufacturer 
ships the boxes to software distributors that, in turn, ship the boxes to retail stores 
for sale to end users. OEM distribution operates like retail distribution, with a few 
variations. The software developer provides a master disk to the OEM and the 
OEM installs the software on its PCs.183 The PCs are then sold either directly by 
the OEM or through its distribution network to retail stores for sale to end users. 
However, these days, software developers distribute their software in a 
wide variety of other ways including through email, on websites, in chat rooms, 
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and via social-media platforms.184 In these distribution channels, sometimes a copy 
of software is distributed or downloaded, but other times the software is streamed 
as a service over the Internet with no copy retained by the end user. In software-as-
service distribution models, because no copy is in play, there is no copy that gets 
the benefit of the first sale doctrine.185 But when a copy is in play, how does 
Impression Products relate to these distribution models, new and old? The answer 
depends on a careful parsing of Impression Products, particularly the Court’s 
discussion of General Talking Pictures. 
In General Talking Pictures, a patent holder had licensed a distributor to 
sell the patentee’s amplifiers only to noncommercial end users. When the 
distributor violated the license by selling amplifiers to commercial end users, the 
patentee sued the distributor and end user for patent infringement and won.186 In its 
analysis of General Talking Pictures, the Court in Impression Products described 
the transaction between the patentee and the distributor as a license rather than a 
first sale.187 As such, according to the Court, the distributor violated a license 
condition rather than a condition on a product sale, which resulted in a successful 
patent infringement suit for the patentee rather than a successful first sale defense 
for the distributor.188 
The impact of Impression Products for licenses to distribute software 
perhaps depends on the structure of the distribution transaction. The Court seems 
to acknowledge that businesses can structure transactions as licenses to distribute 
products rather than sales of products.189 As the Court put it, “a license . . . is about 
changing the contours of the patentee’s monopoly[,] . . . expanding the club of 
authorized producers and sellers.”190 To best fit the Court’s paradigm, the parties 
should signal as clearly as possible in their contract documents that the transaction 
is indeed a distribution license rather than a sales contract. In addition, to the 
extent the license involves both copying and distributing software, the transaction 
moves even farther from a first sale along the lines of the Court’s rejection of a 
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first sale defense in Bowman v. Monsanto, where the infringer both used and 
copied the patented product.191 
2. Licenses to Enable Use 
So far, we have seen that Impression Products leaves the software 
industry’s upstream licenses intact and leaves room for its licenses to distribute 
products. But can the same be said for its impact on EULAs? Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion seems to slam the door on any conditions purportedly placed on 
end-user sales.192 A transaction with an end user, it seems, is a first sale no matter 
what.193 Did the Court leave the door open even a crack for EULAs? We turn now 
to why the answer to that question could be “yes.” 
a. Enforcing EULAs Under Contract Law 
One of the most striking things about Impression Products is how 
strongly the Court points to contracts and contract remedies as the normal way to 
implement conditional sales. On five separate occasions, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion mentions that conditions on end-user purchasers are a matter of 
contractual arrangements and contract remedies.194 While this may not seem 
particularly groundbreaking, it is significant in the context of EULAs. Part II 
explained how many challenges to EULAs are based on contract law and, although 
courts have turned aside most of those challenges, the challenges continue to cast a 
shadow on the enforceability of EULAs.195 Consistent with the trend in the lower 
courts,196 Impression Products demonstrates the Court’s comfort with transactions 
that use contracts in tandem with intellectual property rights. To be sure, the Court 
did not rule on contract grounds,197 but it seems to be sending a strong positive 
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signal about the use of contracts in technology businesses.198 That signal should 
provide some comfort to software developers who rely on EULAs. Without this 
comfort, some software developers may turn to increased use of                    
digital-rights-management technologies enforceable via the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.199  
Even though the Court’s comfort with contracts may be good news, the 
bad news is that the software developer will be suing its own customers because 
third parties, such as the remanufacturer in Impression Products, are not in 
contractual privity with the software developer. Most companies are reluctant to 
sue their customers and therefore look for ways to sue a third party.200 Fortunately, 
however, most EULA cases do not involve consumers but involve rival businesses 
violating EULAs for competitive business purposes.201 Additionally, in some 
instances, a software developer will be able to seek remedies against a third party 
for tortious interference with contract.202 
More bad news is that contract remedies are often less desirable203 than 
copyright or patent remedies because contract remedies consist primarily of 
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litigation); Jessica Gallegos, Note, A New Role for Tortious Interference in the Digital Age: 
A Model to Enforce End User License Agreements, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 411 (2011). See 
generally DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§§ 616–37 (2d ed. 2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766.  
 203. However, contract remedies may be adequate in some cases. For example, 
even though injunctive relief may be the best remedy for breaches of open-source licenses, a 
specific-performance remedy may be equally useful for requiring attribution or releasing 
source code. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at § 12.5; 12 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS §§ 63.1–.24 (Rev. ed. 2012); 25 RICHARD LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§ 67 (4th ed. 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 357–69 (1981); Alan 
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). Ironically, at one 
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compensatory damages while copyright and patent laws also provide for injunctive 
relief and statutory damages.204 For example, the most useful remedy for a 
violation of a free and open-source software license may be a positive injunction to 
provide attribution or release derivative code.205 As the court noted in Jacobsen v. 
Katzer, “these types of license restrictions might well be rendered meaningless 
absent the ability to enforce through injunctive relief.”206 Consequently, a close 
look at Impression Products is necessary to see whether it leaves the door open for 
obtaining intellectual property-based remedies.207 
b. Impression Products Leaves the Door Ajar 
Despite the Court’s emphatic refusal to enforce conditions on transactions 
with end users through patent law, the Court’s opinion leaves the door ajar. The 
opening can be found where the Court discusses General Talking Pictures. Recall 
that the patentee in General Talking Pictures successfully sued both the distributor 
and the end user for breach of a license which had restricted distribution to 
noncommercial end users. In explaining the reason for allowing the customer to be 
sued for patent infringement in General Talking Pictures, the Court in Impression 
Products noted that the user “knew about the breach” of the license and, 
consequently, “participated in” the distributor–licensee’s infringement.208 The 
Court treated the transaction as a non-sale for purposes of patent exhaustion 
because the sale was outside the scope of the distributor’s license. As the Court put 
it, “General Talking Pictures, then, stands for the modest principle that, if a 
                                                                                                            
time the open-source community insisted that open-source licenses were not contracts, 
although now that view largely has been put to rest. See Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. 
O’Rourke, Rethinking Consideration in the Electronic Age, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 326–31 
(2009). 
 204. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection 
of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 167 (1997) 
(“Copyright remedies, featuring injunctive relief and its adjuncts such as seizure and 
destruction of infringing copies, are far stronger than contract remedies; for example, 
specific performance is a relative rarity.”). 
 205. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also 
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: Tales from a 
Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335 (2009). 
 206. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376; see also Yamini Menon, Jacobsen Revisited: 
Conditions, Covenants, and the Future of Open Source Licensing, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & 
ARTS 311 (2011). 
 207. Another option is for software developers to rely increasingly on         
digital-rights-management technology. See Rub, supra note 9, at 1217–19. 
 208. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1535 (2017). 
Although the Court does not put it in these terms, its characterization seems like a 
description of some type of secondary liability. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776–80 (2005) (describing contributory and vicarious 
liability); see also Brief for Intellectual Property Professors and American Antitrust Institute 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (No. 15-1189), 
2017 WL 394279, at *14–15 (describing the end user’s liability as indirect and based on 
inducement). 
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patentee has not given authority for a licensee to make a sale, that sale cannot 
exhaust the patentee’s rights.”209 
The Court was quick to point out, however, that patentees cannot impose 
patent-enforced post-sale restrictions on products either directly or indirectly 
through one of its licensees. Nonetheless, if a software developer can inform third 
parties about the limited scope of the license with its distributor with a prominent 
warning or notice,210 then perhaps any third party who learns about the scope of 
the license via the warning and ignores it cannot take advantage of the first sale 
defense. This is because the third party “knew about” and therefore “participated 
in” the distributor’s infringement. In other words, even though a software 
developer cannot get intellectual property-based remedies for breach of a condition 
in a EULA, it can get remedies for copyright infringement based on a third party’s 
knowing disregard of an upstream condition on the distributor’s license to 
distribute the developer’s software. 
However, label warnings were not enough to overcome a first sale 
defense in Bobbs–Merrill211 or Kirtsaeng.212 This suggests that a patentee or 
copyright holder must provide strong proof that a third party knew or should have 
known about the limited nature of the distributor’s license. In other words, a clear 
and conspicuous warning describing the limited nature of the distributor’s license 
might work, but a single warning buried in a EULA would not suffice. 
c. Interpreting the Copyright Code Rather than the Common Law 
Another potential opening for recovering copyright-based remedies for 
breach of a EULA can be found in the Copyright Act. Impression Products notes 
the kinship and common purpose between the patent and copyright exhaustion 
doctrines. Indeed, this common purpose and kinship led the Court to rule that the 
sale of patented products abroad, like sales of copyrighted books overseas in 
Kirtsaeng, exhausted the right to use, sell, and import patented products anywhere 
in the world.213 
The congruence between patent and copyright first sales exists, as the 
Court notes, but only to a point: patent exhaustion is court-created common law 
but copyright exhaustion is Congress-codified statutory law. It is perfectly 
appropriate for the Supreme Court to develop the common law patent exhaustion 
doctrine by drawing on principles from a code like the Copyright Act—common 
law must come from somewhere, and the copyright first sale doctrine seems like a 
logical point of reference. However, the copyright first sale doctrine depends on 
                                                                                                            
 209. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1535. 
 210. For example, a notice for academic-use-only software could look like this—
NOTICE OF LICENSE LIMITATION: The distributor of this software is licensed by the 
copyright holder only for distribution to academic users. Because of this, if you are not an 
academic user, then you are not permitted to use the software and your use violates 
copyright law. 
 211. 210 U.S. 339, 339–41 (1908). 
 212. 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013). 
 213. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1535–36.  
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what Congress said in the Copyright Act. Thus, a court must assess the scope of 
the copyright first sale doctrine by interpreting Title 17 of the U.S. Code rather 
than tracing the development of the common law exhaustion doctrine from the 
seventeenth century as the Court did in Impression Products.214 
Turning to the text of the Copyright Act, § 109(a) limits the copyright 
holder’s right to enforce the exclusive distribution right granted in § 106(3) against 
“the owner of a particular copy.” However, § 109(a) is itself limited by § 109(d): 
“The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (c) do not . . . extend to any 
person who has acquired possession of the copy . . . from the copyright owner by 
rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it.”215 To put it 
concisely, the first sale privilege applies to owners of a copy but not to anyone 
who has acquired a copy “otherwise.”216 
The history of §109(a) supports the conclusion that only owners of copies 
are entitled to claim a first sale defense. To begin, the common-law predecessor of 
§ 109(a),217 Bobbs–Merill Co. v. Straus, addressed a user-owned copy, and the 
Supreme Court noted that there was “no claim in this case of a . . . license 
agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the books.”218 Consistent with that, 
the House Report for § 109(a) says that it applies when a copyright holder “has 
transferred ownership of a particular copy.”219 The House Report for § 109(d)220 
states that the section limits the first sale defense, set out in § 109(a), “by making 
clear that [it does] not apply to someone who merely possesses a copy . . . without 
                                                                                                            
 214. Id. at 1531–32. See generally O’Connor, supra note 93. 
 215. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2012) (emphasis added). Note that the Copyright Act 
clearly allows copyright holders to utilize a variety of transaction models, including first 
sales but also including renting, leasing, bailing, consigning, licensing, and lending. See 17 
U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(a); 17 U.S.C. § 203 (referring to exclusive and nonexclusive grants of a 
transfer or license of a copyright or any right under a copyright); Quality King Distribs., 
Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146–47 (1998) (referring to bailment, 
consignment, and licensing); see also 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2012)(referring to transferring 
ownership and licensing). 
 216. For comparison of a different legislative approach taken in Europe, see 
UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., Case C-128/11, European Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) (July 3, 2012) (construing Articles 4(2) and 5(1) of Directive 2009/24/EC of the 
European Parliament which sets out the EU’s exhaustion rules for computer programs). 
 217. The first sale doctrine was originally codified at 17 U.S.C. § 41 (1909). 
When Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, the statutory reference became § 109(a). 
See also 17 U.S.C. § 204 (referring to transferring ownership and licensing). 
 218. 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908); see also 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (“The privileges 
prescribed by subsections (a) and (c) do not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, 
extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy or phonorecord from the 
copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it.”); 
cf. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 523 U.S. at 146–47 (“[T]the first sale doctrine would not 
provide a defense to a § 602(a) action against any non-owner such as a bailee, a licensee, a 
consignee, or one whose possession of the copy is unlawful.”). 
 219. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976). 
 220. The House Report refers to § 109 (c) but that section was renumbered 109(d) 
in the 1984 amendments to the Copyright Act. See Pub. L. 100-450, § 2(1). 
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having acquired ownership of it. Acquisition of an object embodying a copyrighted 
work by rental, lease, loan, or bailment carries with it no privilege to dispose of it 
under section 109(a) . . . .”221 
To summarize, the Copyright Act gives a first sale privilege to anyone 
who owns a copy. However, it does not give a first sale privilege to anyone else: 
not to lessees, consignees, bailees,222 or anyone who acquires a copy otherwise. 
Thus, the Copyright Act does not give the first sale privilege to software end users 
who acquire a copy of software otherwise in a EULA transaction where they do 
not purchase title to a copy. 
Scholars have criticized the notion that software developers can license 
copies as opposed to copyrights.223 However, the Copyright Act clearly allows 
copyright holders to rent, lease, bail, consign, and lend copies. It also indicates that 
these transaction models are not exclusive because it uses the catchall phrase “or 
otherwise.” Indeed, this flexibility is prescient. By leaving room for business 
model innovation, the Copyright Act has supported the innovative licensing 
practices such as those of the free and open-source software movement.224 
Sometimes recognizing the exhaustion of rights in a copy is good economic policy 
and consistent with copyright’s objectives, but not always.225 Other times, as 
Justice Kennedy reminded us in eBay v. MercExchange, we should bear in mind 
the economic impact of new ways to exploit intellectual property that “present 
conditions quite unlike earlier cases.”226 
                                                                                                            
 221. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 80. The legislative history of § 117, a related 
provision that provides an essential-step defense for certain copies made by software users, 
suggests that, like § 109(a), the defense is only available to owners of copies rather than 
mere possessors. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(describing Congress’s last-minute replacement of the words rightful possessor with the 
word owner in the final version of the bill that was enacted into law). 
 222. See Duffy & Hynes, supra note 13, at 54 (noting the Supreme Court’s 
openness to leasing copies to avoid exhaustion). 
 223. See Carver, supra note 77, at 1896–97. 
 224. See BJ Ard, Notice and Remedies in Copyright Licensing, 80 MO. L. REV. 
313, 320 (2015); David McGowan, The Tory Anarchism of F/OSS Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 207, 223–24 (2011); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 42. The licensing practices of the open 
source movement continue to evolve. See Greg R. Vetter, Commercial Free and Open 
Source Software: Knowledge Production, Hybrid Appropriability & Patents, 77 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2087 (2009). 
 225. Even ardent advocates of copy ownership acknowledge that first sale and 
licensing business models have their distinct advantages. See PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, 
supra note 9, at 5–6 (summarizing the advantages of licensing). According to Perzanowski 
and Schultz, “Today, we operate in a market that—for the most part—affords a choice 
between ownership and more conditional, impermanent access to digital and physical 
goods. These choices are neither right nor wrong . . . . There are thing we gain and things 
we lose.” Id. at 6. 
 226. 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy was 
talking about so-called patent trolls, but his point goes beyond patents and the licensing 
practices of patent trolls. Software licensing does not (in the words of the Court in 
Impression Products) “clog the channels of commerce” with “little extra benefit.” Software 
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d. Remedies Through a Better Lens: Contractual Covenants/License 
Conditions 
As Impression Products highlights, a pivotal question in assessing 
intellectual property-related contracts is when intellectual property remedies 
should be available. To put that question squarely in the software context, when 
can a software developer sue an end user for copyright infringement for breach of 
a EULA? Commentators treat the license/first sale boundary as the critical fault 
line keeping intellectual property remedies in-bounds. But, that puts undue 
pressure on the first sale doctrine, perhaps encouraging us to interpret it too 
broadly for fear that copyright holders will gain too much litigation power.227 
We can relieve pressure on the first sale doctrine by using a better lens. 
Rather than focus on the line between a license and first sale, the focus should be 
on the difference between a EULA’s contractual covenants and its license 
conditions.228 Copyright remedies are only available for breach of a license 
condition in a EULA, not a mere contractual covenant.229 With this approach, a 
software developer gets all the contract-related benefits of its EULA but only gets 
the benefit of copyright remedies when there is a nexus between breach of a 
particular EULA term and an exclusive right granted by the Copyright Act.230 
VI. CLARIFYING THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
THROUGH LEGISLATION 
Part V’s discussion of § 109 illustrates that the Copyright Act could 
certainly benefit from more clarity about how end-user licensing fits together with 
the first sale doctrine. This Part outlines a series of clarifications. The time might 
be right from a political standpoint to codify these clarifications for several 
reasons. First, although many commentators initially were skeptical about the 
benefits of end-user licensing, its importance for business model innovation in the 
software industry is now better known and appreciated.231 Second, the potentially 
                                                                                                            
licensing is critical to business model innovation, benefitting both software developers and 
end users. End users now expect EULAs and can deal with them expeditiously especially 
because EULAs are normally presented in electronic form. See Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 
658 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 227. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 
914 (2008). 
 228. See Ard, supra note 224, at 320; Newman, supra note 64, at 1154; Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, Enforcement of Open Source Software Licenses: The MDY Trio’s 
Inconvenient Complications, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 131–37 (2011). 
 229. See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
 230. See MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010); 
see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching and Concerning Copyright: Real 
Property Reasoning in MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1063 (2011). 
 231. See U.S. DEP’T COM., INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, 
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2013); see also PERZANOWSKI & 
SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 169 (stressing the benefits of copy ownership but noting that a 
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dire implications of Impression Products for copyright industries may bring those 
industries to the table,232 overcoming their fear that amending § 109 will inevitably 
lead to an expansion of the copyright first sale doctrine to include digital streaming 
(which most oppose).233 
My proposal would add two new provisions to the Copyright Act. The 
first would be an amendment to § 109(d) to specifically mention licenses. Among 
other benefits, this revision would clarify that free and open-source software 
licenses are not first sales under the distinction between licenses and first sales 
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in the Vernor v. Autodesk case.234 The amendment 
would read: “The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (c) do not . . . extend 
to any person who has acquired possession of the copy or phonorecord from the 
copyright owner by rental, lease, loan, license, or otherwise, without acquiring 
ownership of it.” 
My proposal would also add new definitions to § 101 to more fully 
describe the set of possible transaction models that can be used for copyrighted 
works, such as software. It would clarify distinctions between first sales and 
assignments of rights and between first sales and licenses. The additional 
definitions would read: 
An “assignment” is any transaction in which the copyright owner 
transfers the title to the copyright in a work of authorship. 
A “first sale” is any transaction in which the copyright owner sells a 
copy of a work of authorship with no limits on the use or re-
distribution of the copy. 
A “license” is any transaction in which the copyright owner either: 
(a) grants permission to exercise any of the rights granted in § 106, 
or (b) limits the use or re-distribution of a copy of a work of 
authorship in an enforceable contract.235 
The new definition of license identifies it as a transaction model that is distinct 
from leases and first sales. In a license, the copyright holder provides a certain 
package of rights: sometimes more than a first sale would provide, sometimes less, 
                                                                                                            
“future that deemphasizes ownership is not only inevitable, it’s already here” and pointing 
out that this is part of a “broader and deeper cultural shift away from ownership”); 
Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, at 897–98 (highlighting the use of EULAs by a variety of non-
profits organizations, including Consumers Union and the University of California at 
Berkeley); Rub, supra note 9, at 1199–211 (concluding that the doomsday predictions of 
scholars about the negative effect of EULAs on consumer rights and copyright fair use are 
not born out in the case law). 
 232. See generally Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013). 
 233. See U.S. DEP’T COM., INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, FIRST SALE, AND 
STATUTORY DAMAGES (2016). 
 234. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 228, at 120–24 (highlighting the mismatch 
between the Vernor test and free and open-source software licensing). 
 235. Subsection (b) codifies a variation of the definition set forth in Vernor v. 
Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).   
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but often more rights in some ways and less in other ways. For example, an      
end-user license for word processing software might limit use and distribution to 
student users but allow the end user to make additional copies for up to three 
devices and create derivative works of clip art. 
 Use Copies Derivative Works Distribution 
License 
Variable 
LimitedßàUnlimited 
Variable   
1ßàUnlimited  
Variable   
0ßà Unlimited 
Variable  
0ßàUnlimited 
Lease 
Variable  
Limited ßàUnlimited  
1 None None 
First 
Sale Unlimited 1 None Unlimited 
FIGURE: Comparison of License, Lease, and First Sale Transactions 
The new definitions, of course, assume that Congress accepts the value of 
licensing—including licensing copies—as consistent with the purposes of the 
Copyright Act.236 To be sure, many commentators will object. Among scholars, 
EULAs are the Rodney Dangerfield of transaction models—they get no respect. 
Objections to EULAs contributed to the limited adoption of the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”).237 But in the courts EULAs do get 
respect, with courts enforcing EULAs regularly for over two decades. It makes 
sense for Congress to put licenses on par with leases, consignments, and bailments 
for purposes of the first sale doctrine for several reasons. 
First, licenses are a distinct and valuable transaction model that provides 
better flexibility for software developers and more choice for end users than other 
models (such as first sales).238 It took a while for this to come into focus, but that is 
                                                                                                            
 236. As the court put it in describing open-source software, “[o]pen source 
licensing has become a widely used method of creative collaboration that serves to advance 
the arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace that few could have imagined a few decades 
ago.” Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008); cf. Wallace v. IBM Corp., 
467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006) (describing how free and open-source licensing advances 
competition-law policies). 
 237. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to -816 (West 2000); VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to -509.2 (2001). For a summary of the debates surrounding UCITA, 
see GOMULKIEWICZ, NGUYEN & CONWAY, supra note 33, at 6–7. 
 238. See supra Section II.C (summarizing the benefits of EULAs for customers). I 
do not believe that business models utilizing EULAs are perfect by any means. The use of 
EULAs has downsides, of course, including the information costs associated with 
ascertaining license terms and the perils always associated with standard-form contracting 
practices. Indeed, I believe that using EULAs is not the best option in many situations and, 
infra, I urge practicing lawyers to assess judiciously whether a EULA is better than a first 
sale. However, the question is not whether EULAs are perfect; the question is whether 
software developers should be able to choose a EULA-based business model when and if it 
makes sense. See PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 9, at 169 (pointing out the benefits 
of first sale transactions, but ultimately emphasizing the importance of meaningful choice in 
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not surprising because transaction models develop over time. Land provides a 
useful example. As the needs of land owners and land users evolved, transaction 
models developed to meet their needs—transactions for land now include sales, 
leases, easements, and licenses of various types.239 Software licensing has now 
arrived as a discrete and worthy transaction model,240 and now it makes sense for 
Congress to explicitly acknowledge that in § 109(d).241 
Second, the need for licensing is significantly more pronounced for 
software than for hard goods because of the nature of software products.242 
Software’s usefulness varies from product to product and often involves nuanced 
permissions to use, copy, distribute, and create derivative works.243 This makes 
sense because software products are as much or more of a service than a good,244 
so the transactions for software should resemble service contracts as much or more 
than sales contracts.245 Thus, software licenses do not present (as the Court in 
Impression Products suggested) “hateful” and “obnoxious” restraints on 
                                                                                                            
transaction models); see also Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7 (describing ways to improve 
EULAs). 
 239. See generally JESSE DUKENMINIER, PROPERTY § 3 (7th ed. 2010); CURTIS J. 
BERGER, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE § 3.2 (4th ed. 1997). The same is true of 
personal property, which has developed transactions to sell, rent, lease, bail, consign, and 
lend (among others), as reflected for example in the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 
(sales of goods), 2A (leases of goods), and Article 9 (secured transactions). Indeed, the 
official recognition of new commercial practices through passage of the Uniform 
Commercial Code took a long time. See Raymond T. Nimmer, UCITA and the Continuing 
Evolution of Digital Licensing Law, COMPUTER & INTERNET L., Mar. 2004, at 10–11. 
Commentators note, however, that personal-property forms are more limited than real-
property forms for a variety of reasons, including information costs. See Christina Mulligan, 
Personal Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things, 50 GA. L. REV. 1121, 1126–32 
(2016). 
 240. See Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011); 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 241. As discussed supra, § 109(d) already includes licenses implicitly. Doing so 
explicitly will improve certainty of contracting. My proposed revisions to the Copyright Act 
would be part of the ongoing process of commercial law and intellectual property law 
attempting to catch up with each other. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, In the Name of Patent 
Stewardship: The Federal Circuit’s Overreach into Commercial Law, 67 FLA. L. REV. 127 
(2015); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 242. Commentators stress the concerns associated with the licensing of hard 
goods, particularly concerns related to consumer expectations and privacy. See, e.g., Stacy-
Ann Elvy, Hybrid Transactions and the Internet of Things: Goods, Services, or Software?, 
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2017); Mulligan, supra note 239. 
 243. Even though this Article focuses on software licensing, other copyright 
industries have or will experiment with licensing copies of their works. However, as 
discussed infra, the choice of licensing as a transaction model requires careful weighing of 
the pros and cons. And even if licensing seems attractive to the copyright holder, this 
approach may fail in the marketplace. See Duffy & Hynes, supra note 13, at 64 (describing 
the challenges Aspen faced with its connected casebook business model). 
 244. Think, for example, of Google’s search and map software and the 
Facebook’s social-network software. 
 245. See Duffy & Hynes, supra note 13, at 70. 
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chattels.246 Instead, they present appropriately fitting terms and conditions for 
products that are a hybrid of goods and services. Moreover, as a digital good, 
software is easy to copy and modify in contrast to most hard goods, which 
encourages users to make copies and derivative works that a first sale does not 
allow. Consequently, EULAs play an important instructional role for software end 
users.247 Indeed, to the extent the Supreme Court is concerned with encumbering 
commerce, it should avoid burdening hybrid goods/services products by limiting 
the available transaction options to those that were developed for sales of 
chattels.248 
Third, while the Supreme Court concluded in Impression Products that 
the commerce-clogging effect of conditional sales is not worth the extra control 
that patent remedies provide,249 the opposite is true for software. Software 
developers need the extra control because of the nature of software, as explained 
above. In contrast to sales of goods, end-user licensing of software is the 
expected—rather than the exceptional—transaction model.250 Thus, EULAs flow 
easily with software products throughout the digital economy, lubricating 
commerce rather than clogging it up.251 
Fourth, the Supreme Court pointed out that many modern products are 
subject to both copyright and patent protection, concluding it “would make little 
theoretical or practical sense” to have patent and copyright exhaustion doctrines 
that differ. However, as discussed previously, the different underpinnings of patent 
exhaustion (common law) and copyright first sale (statutory) require different 
approaches. But just as important, differing approaches do not present the practical 
challenges that the Court assumes. Software is often protected by copyright and 
patent law, as well as trademark and trade secret law.252 Consequently, in software 
litigation, courts routinely evaluate many types of intellectual property claims in 
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the same case.253 For each type of intellectual property claim, courts carefully 
analyze the varying standards for scope of protection, purported infringing activity, 
and applicable defenses (such as different approaches to “fair use”).254 They also 
apply the differing remedy regimes for each type of intellectual property, adjusting 
remedies when needed to avoid unfair redundant recovery.255 
VII. ADVISING SOFTWARE INDUSTRY CLIENTS AFTER IMPRESSION 
PRODUCTS 
Impression Products will undoubtedly cause lawyers who advise software 
developers to evaluate the continuing viability of their downstream licensing 
models. This Article provides some guidance on where changes may be needed. 
For example, lawyers should consider whether a clear and conspicuous warning is 
better than a wordy EULA to provide notice of upstream license conditions that 
could trigger a claim for copyright infringement.256 
This Part highlights two additional impacts for practicing lawyers to 
consider. First, Impression Products shows the importance of contract law 
remedies in software transactions. Often contract remedies will be the only 
remedies available. As such, lawyers need to make sure their clients are taking 
adequate measures to form an enforceable contract.257 Courts have provided the 
general template for an enforceable EULA: the software developer needs to 
provide a meaningful opportunity to review the terms and a meaningful way to 
manifest assent.258 
Even with the best legal counsel, however, clients sometimes push back 
on taking the measures necessary to form an enforceable contract.259 Occasionally 
the client nefariously wants to hide terms,260 but usually the client simply wants to 
use the EULA-devoted space to communicate other information to the customer or 
believes the contract formation process (paradoxically) is not “customer 
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friendly.”261 This phenomenon leads to a second impact of Impression Products: 
advising clients to use fewer EULAs. 
Impression Products should motivate practicing lawyers to systematically 
assess the pros and cons of using a EULA at all. Lawyers should have been 
performing such an assessment all along, but even talented lawyers get caught up 
in a bandwagon of contracting practices.262 Lawyers who counsel software 
developers often uncritically recommend EULAs because it is customary; in other 
words, they do it just to be “safe.” But deploying EULAs comes at a cost to 
clients, and, in many cases, the cost of deploying a truly enforceable EULA is not 
worth the benefit. If a client wants the benefits of contract law remedies, then the 
client needs a contract that is enforceable. So if a client resists doing the things 
necessary to create an enforceable contract, then it’s simply not worth deploying a 
nonenforceable EULA. At the same time, lawyers should be re-motivated to 
explore creative contracting techniques that are both enforceable and user 
friendly263 or other creative commercial law alternatives to EULAs.264 
VIII. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: HOW MUCH DOES IMPRESSION 
PRODUCTS REALLY MATTER? 
As we look to the future of software technology, we see two significant 
trends: software as a service and software embedded in goods. One trend indicates 
that Impression Products does not matter much, while the other indicates that it 
matters very much. To the extent business models move toward software as a 
service, the first sale doctrine does not matter because the software developer is 
not providing copies in the transaction.265 To the extent business models move 
toward embedded software, the first sale doctrine comes squarely into play 
because the product always contains a copy of the software. Indeed, for software 
embedded in hard goods, the congruence between copyright and patent exhaustion 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Impression Products seems particularly 
strong. 
However, the only safe thing that we can say about the future of business 
models in the software industry is that they will continue to evolve. Technology 
companies such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft constantly 
experiment with different mixes of goods and services.266 Do they provide 
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services? Yes! Do they provide goods? Yes! Do they provide bundles of goods and 
services? Yes! The most important principle for the law post-Impression Products 
is that it enables, rather than impedes, business-model innovation. The precise 
question, then, is not whether “the license is the product”—sometimes it will be 
and sometimes it won’t—but whether the license can be the product when it makes 
sense for the innovative business models that software developers dream up to 
bring their technology to market.267 
CONCLUSION 
We live in an information economy in which licensing is the predominant 
transaction model. The software industry relies on licenses to develop innovative 
products and bring them to market in a variety of creative ways. As software users, 
we encounter licenses on a regular basis. For us, the license is the product—
software provides the functionality but the license provides what can be done with 
the software. State and federal courts have enforced software licenses for more 
than two decades. However, after Impression Products the software industry now 
faces a critical question—is the license still the product? 
Fortunately, the case does not disrupt licenses used to build products and 
create customer solutions and leaves adequate room for innovative distribution 
licensing. And while the Supreme Court shut the door on enforcing end-user 
licenses using patent law, it left the door open for using contract law to enforce 
them. The Supreme Court also seemed to shut the door on using copyright law to 
enforce end-user licenses by linking the patent and copyright exhaustion doctrines. 
However, a close examination of the Copyright Act reveals that a statutory 
copyright first sale differs from common law patent exhaustion, leaving the door 
ajar for enforcement of end-user licenses using copyright law. Nonetheless, it 
would be wise for Congress to amend the Copyright Act to clarify that end-user 
licenses are not first sales. As Congress and the courts begin to address software 
licensing in the aftermath of Impression Products, one guiding principle seems 
clear—both software developers and users will be better served if the license is 
still the product, enforceable under contract and copyright law. 
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